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Demographic Divide and Labor Migration 
in the Euro-Mediterranean Region
*
 
This paper provides a demographic outlook of the Euro-Mediterranean region and then 
shows the economic and fiscal consequences of such demographic differences within a two-
region model with international labor mobility. International labor mobility is also examined 
through an externalities framework where brain drain from migration could be taxed by the 
home countries. Taxing the brain drain has a substantial limiting effect on labor migration and 
a small negative effect on per worker growth. On the other hand, it could be a solution to the 
negative externality problem associated with brain drain. It is also found that such tax can 
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1. Introduction 
  There is a significant demographic divide in the Euro-Mediterranean Region 
between European countries  in the North and the Southern Mediterranean Countries 
(SMCs) in the South.  The SMCs have higher fertility and population growth rates and a 
significantly younger age structure than the Northern Mediterranean countries and most 
other countries and regions.  The 2002 Arab Human Development Report notes that this 
can present a “demographic gift or a demographic curse” depending on whether the high 
population growth and fertility can be transformed into human wealth through capital 
investments and technological progress.  Similarly, Dhonte, Bhattacharya and Yousef 
(2000)  and Dhillon and Yousef (2009) argued that “explosion” in the  working-age 
population in the Middle East present challenges as well as opportunities for those 
countries.  The similarly unique demographic characteristics of the SMCs show stark 
contrast to the European counterparts  where  countries  are  experiencing  a serious 
demographic deficit through population aging.
1
An important outcome of the demographic differences mentioned above has been 
substantial labor migration from the Southern Mediterranean to the European countries in 
the North.
   
2
                                                 
1 In an entry in the forthcoming Encyclopedia of Global Human Migration, Tosun (forthcoming) defines 
demographic deficit as “an imbalance or shortage in the human population of a country, province or any 
other regional or local jurisdiction that arises mainly from differences in age, sexes, and geographic 
concentration of that population, such as rural-urban or suburban population differences.” 
2 These demographic differences can also lead to capital flows between regions.  See Börsch-Supan, 
Ludwig and Winter (2005), Tosun (2003) and Tosun (2007) for studies on examining the link between 
population aging and capital flows.  
  According to the United Nations’ 2005 revision of international migration 
trends, Europe has been host to about 34 per cent of all migrants in 2005.  Fargues (2006) 
showed that “Europe is the single largest destination of first-generation Arab emigrants, 
and hosts 59% of all such emigrants worldwide” (Fargues, 2006: 8, 25).  While such   2 
labor migration has been driven mainly by economic and demographic differences 
between these two regions, it has created important externalities.  These externalities took 
the form of negative externalities through brain drain in the SMCs and both positive 
externalities through brain gain and negative externalities through congestion and social 
problems for the European countries.  Bhagwati (1972, 1976a, 1976b) argued that taxing 
this brain drain could be a solution to the negative externality problem.  He also argued 
that the current system of income taxation based on residence instead of citizenship leads 
to representation of immigrant workers in home countries without taxation.  This brain-
drain tax idea is resurfacing again in the recent literature where several papers have 
argued the virtues of such a tax for developing countries (Desai, Kapur and McHale, 
2004; Straubhaar, 2000).   
This paper describes the demographic and migration trends in the Euro-
Mediterranean region and then shows the economic and fiscal consequences of such 
demographic differences within a two-region model with international labor mobility. 
International labor migration is examined also through  an  international  externalities 
framework that has recently been popularized by Kaul et al. (1999, 2006).  At the same 
time, the paper contributes to the literature on brain drain and taxation that dates back to 
Bhagwati’s original proposal in mid-1970s.  
The paper is structured as follows. The next section provides a demographic 
outlook of the region. This is followed by a numerical simulation exercise based on a 
stylized two-region, two-period overlapping generations model with international labor 
mobility in section 3. Section 4 shows budgetary implications of a brain drain tax and 
discusses issues related to the administration of such a tax. The last section presents 
summary and concluding remarks.   3 
2. Demographic Outlook of the Mediterranean Region 
Mediterranean region has gone through a significant demographic change in the 
past fifty years and is also expected to go through more changes in coming decades. 
Table 1 shows the basic demographic statistics for the Mediterranean region for the years 
1960, 2010 and 2050.
3
As shown in Figures 2 and 3, Southern Mediterranean Countries (SMCs), 
however,  have and will continue to have significantly younger populations than the 
European countries while this gap between these countries is expected to close to some 
extent by 2050.  For those countries the key age group in terms of size is the 15-29 age 
groups indicating the youth bulge. For the European counterparts, population pyramid in 
Figure 3 looks already different in 2010 with 35-39 as the largest age group. By 2050 we 
expect 65-69 and 70-74 age groups to be the biggest groups together with the 40-44 age 
group. This variation between regions can also be illustrated in Figures 4 and 5 where the 
two opposite extreme cases are shown for Palestinian Territories, and Spain, respectively. 
It is interesting that the region will continue to have these vast demographic differences 
 This shows the magnitude of the aging of the populations in the 
region. While the population is expected to reach about 590 million by 2050, population 
growth rate decreases almost to zero for the region. This is explained by the decrease in 
the total fertility rate to well below replacement rate of 2.1. Substantial increases in the 
median age, share of population 65 and older, and the old-age dependency ratio are clear 
evidence on the demographic deficit through population aging. The demographic change 
in the region is also shown in the population pyramids in Figure 1. 
<Insert Table 1 here> 
<Insert Figure 1 here> 
                                                 
3 This table shows data for countries that have Mediterranean Sea coast. Figures shown for 2050 are UN 
projections based on medium-fertility scenario.   4 
where West Bank Gaza will continue to have a population pyramid that is typical for a 
developing country and Spain will have a population that looks almost nothing like an 
actual pyramid. For Spain, the projections in Figure 5 show that 70-74 age group will 
become the largest population age group. 
<Insert Figures 2-5 here> 
  The demographic divide between the two sub-regions can also be seen in the 
maps in Figures 6 and 7. Figure 6 shows that the fertility rate is higher in the SMCs with 
an average total fertility rate of 2.1 for the Mediterranean region, which also happens to 
be the replacement rate of a population. Among the Mediterranean countries Turkey has a 
total fertility rate that is roughly equal to the region average. We also see that while the 
average total fertility rate in the region is significantly smaller than the one for the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) region or the Arab world, it is still higher than the one for 
the OECD countries or the European Union (EU) countries. When we look at the old-age 
dependency ratio, it is now the European countries in the North of the Mediterranean that 
have significantly higher old-age dependency ratio. Most of the SMCs have a ration less 
than 10%. Mediterranean countries on average have a higher old-age dependency ratio 
than the Arab world and the MENA region but still a lower ratio than the OECD 
countries and the EU countries. 
<Insert Figures 6 and 7 here> 
  The flow and stock of migrants in the region are shown in Figures 8 and 9, 
respectively. While the Southern European (or the Northern Mediterranean) countries 
were home countries during the “guest worker” migration in the 1950s and 1970s, they 
became mainly host countries for migration starting 1980s. Among the original guest 
worker home countries, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain now have positive net   5 
migration rates and Turkey’s net migration rate is very close to zero. On the other hand, 
most of the SMCs have negative net migration rates, which indicates that they are net 
senders of migrants. Countries like Jordan, Libya, Syria and Palestinian Territories are 
exceptions due to large Palestinian refugee populations in those countries. Figure 9 shows 
that Southern European (or Northern Mediterranean) countries now have a large stock of 
migrants compared to most of the SMCs. The Mediterranean region as a whole is a net 
recipient of migrants, with an average rate less than the averages for the OECD countries 
and the EU countries, but the region has a higher stock of migrant population as a share 
of total country population than all other regions compared in Figure 9. 
<Insert Figures 8 and 9 here> 
  In the next section, the economic and fiscal consequences of such demographic 
differences are presented in a numerical simulation model with international labor 
mobility.  
3. Aging Europe and Brain Drain from SMCs 
3.1. Closed Economy and Labor Mobility Simulation Results 
  Simulations in this section are based on a two-region and two-period overlapping 
generations model.
4
  We start with the “perfect labor mobility model” where there is perfect international labor 
mobility with migrant labor participating in the political system of the host country but not the 
home country. Based on the population projections for the two regions, labor migrates from the 
 The population projections for European countries and the SMCs are 
derived from the 2002 revision of the “World Population Prospects” published by the 
United Nations (United Nations, 2002). The simulations will be shown for two 30-year 
periods, 2000–30 and 2030–60 and for the entire period 2000–60. The average population 
growth rates for the 1970–2000 period are used as a starting point.  
                                                 
4 See Tosun (2009) for details on the theoretical model.   6 
SMCs to the European countries. Figure 10 shows this in reference to the change in the number of 
workers in both regions. European countries experience a major boom in foreign workers, 
particularly between 2000 and 2030.  This boom is almost about six times greater than the growth 
attributed to the native worker population.  Figure 11, on the other hand, shows that the SMCs 
send labor to Europe and thus experience significantly lower domestic labor growth despite a 
high population growth.   
<Insert Figures 10 and 11 here> 
  We now compare this to our alternative “labor mobility model with brain drain 
tax” where migrant workers participate in the political system of both host and home 
countries but at the same time remit the additional income tax (brain drain tax) to the 
home country.  Figure 12 shows that this leads to a significant decrease in the number of 
workers migrating to Europe in both periods.  Figure 13 mainly confirms this by showing 
that the growth in the number of workers lost to out-migration of workers is very small 
compared to the overall growth in number of workers.  Apparently, brain drain tax acts as 
a very strong migration control mechanism.  
<Insert Figures 12 and 13 here>   
3.2. Model Comparisons 
  To understand the economic and fiscal impact of brain drain through labor flows, 
we first compare the perfect labor mobility model to a closed economy model.  These 
simulation results are shown in columns (1)-(4) of Tables 2 and 3.  Table 2 shows the per 
worker values of selected economic variables.  European countries benefit from labor 
migration from the SMCs particularly in terms of education spending per worker and 
human capital per worker.  However, they are adversely impacted by the large influx of 
foreign workers in the 2000-2030 period.  The benefits of the labor migration to Europe 
are even clearer when we look at the aggregate economic values shown in Table 3.  The   7 
aging Europe clearly benefits from the economic expansion made possible by the 
contributions of migrant workers as laborers, savers and participants in the policymaking 
that determines the provision of the productivity enhancing public good (education).  
SMCs, on the other hand, suffer economically (lower capital, human capital and income 
growth) mainly due to loss of workers to the European countries.  As mentioned before, 
the impact of the loss of workers on human capital in the SMCs are two fold: first 
through loss of total human capital from outflow of workers and second through reduced 
average human capital for each remaining worker which is due to the loss of productive 
political participation of young workers in the home country.  We see the clear evidence 
of this in the sharp decreases in the income tax rate in the SMCs in both periods.        
  The next comparison is with the labor mobility model with brain drain tax.  
Simulation results for this model are shown in columns (5) and (6) of Tables 2 and 3.  
European countries seem to benefit from such a tax through smaller labor flows that lead 
to more stable changes in the per worker values of their economic variables, particularly 
in capital per worker and income per worker.  On the other hand, their aggregate 
economic expansion is also less pronounced.  Hence, while the brain drain tax has a 
negative impact on the overall economic activity in European countries, it also triggers a 
relatively more stable economic growth by limiting large influx of workers.  For the 
SMCs, the brain drain tax improves on both the human capital per worker and total 
human capital accumulation.  While it seems to limit economic growth slightly in per 
worker terms, it contributes significantly to aggregate economic expansion as seen in 
Table 3. By limiting harmful out-migration of workers, the brain drain tax functions like 
a Pigouvian tax which is considered a first-best solution to the negative externality 
problem.   8 
5. Budgetary Implications of the Brain Drain Tax and Some Administration 
Issues 
Simulations in the previous section give us an idea about the budgetary 
implications of such a tax for the SMCs.  Considering the results for number of migrants, 
the income tax rate in the SMCs and the income per worker in the European countries, 
the share of the brain drain tax in total income tax revenues in the SMCs is calculated as 
2% for the 2000-2030 period and 3% for the 2030-2060 period.  Using actual tax revenue 
figures from the International Monetary Fund’s Government Finance Statistics (GFS), 
these shares translate to about $1.3 billion in average annual income tax revenue for total 
of SMCs until 2030 and about $2.8 billion between 2030 and 2060.
5
 
  These are sizeable 
revenues that SMCs can potentially use to provide enhanced education to the existing 
workforce and in turn help improve human capital accumulation in the SMCs.  A recent 
study by Desai, Kapur and McHale (2004) shows a similarly substantial potential revenue 
gain to India from such taxation.  However, there can be significant issues related to the 
administration and use of such a brain drain tax.  First, this tax requires a tax system 
based on citizenship (the American model) rather than residence in the SMCs.  Currently, 
these countries use a residence-based income tax system and switching to a citizenship-
based system would bring significant administrative costs.  Involvement of international 
institutions and creation of new international migration regimes have also been discussed 
(Straubhaar, 2000; Pastore, 2005).  Additionally, government sector inefficiencies due to 
corruption in the SMCs could also become a hindrance to the productive use of this new 
revenue stream. 
                                                 
5 GFS revenue figures come from IMF (2003) and are for eight of the nine SMCs. Libya is excluded due to 
lack of data.  Tax revenues are averaged for the last three available years (1995-97) and then converted to 
constant 1995 dollars.    9 
6. Conclusions 
This paper describes the demographic and migration trends in the Euro-
Mediterranean region and then  shows  the economic and fiscal consequences of such 
demographic differences within a two-region model with international labor mobility. 
International labor mobility is also examined through an externalities framework where 
brain drain from migration could be taxed by the home countries. The paper used a two-
region, two-period overlapping generations model with international labor mobility to 
examine the efficacy of using such tax policy.  
Demographic outlook of the region shows substantial expected increases in the 
median age, share of population 65 and older, and the old-age dependency ratio which are 
clear evidence of demographic deficit through aging of the population in the region. 
There is however a significant demographic divide in the region largely between North 
and South where the SMCs have and will continue to have significantly younger 
populations than the European countries while the gap between the two sub-regions is 
expected to close to some extent by 2050.  
A tax on the brain drain has a substantial limiting effect on labor migration and a 
small negative effect on per worker growth. It can, however, also raise substantial tax 
revenue for the SMCs which could be used to enhance human capital in the region.  
Administrative costs involved with the tax system required to implement a brain-drain tax 
constitute the biggest obstacle to the use of such a tax. 
 
     10 
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Table 1. Demographic Outlook of the Mediterranean Region 
   1960  2010  2050 
       
Total Population  239 million  471 million  590 million 
Population Growth  1.88%  1.01%  0.07% 
Total Fertility Rate  4.67  2.10  1.83 
Death Rate  12.58  7.15  10.7 
Median Age  23  32.6  43.8 
Population 65 and older  5.80%  10.67%  22.87% 
Old Age Dependency Ratio  10%  15.90%  38.60% 
Share of Urban Population  41.31%  67.55%  81.44% 
Source: United Nations World Population Prospects (2010 Revision). 
 
 
Table 2. Model Comparisons 1/ (per worker values) 
 




(No Labor Mobility) 
   
Perfect Labor Mobility 
Model 
with Migrants Voting 
Only in Host Country 
   
Labor Mobility Model 
with Migrants Voting in 
Both Countries and 
Income Tax on Brain 
Drain 




























                   
Number of workers  2000–2030  22.2  97.2    150.2  46.8    27.7  95.0 
  2030–2060  9.1  36.0    27.3  23.8    16.7  34.0 
  2000–2060  33.3  168.2    218.5  81.7    49.1  161.4 
                   
Capital stock per worker  2000–2030  6.2  144.8    -49.2  119.7    -0.5  65.4 
  2030–2060  -1.6  97.4    44.6  67.8    9.2  82.2 
  2000–2060  4.5  383.3    -26.6  268.8    8.6  201.3 
                   
Human capital per   2000–2030  -2.7  18.6    -2.4  5.2    0.4  7.3 
worker  2030–2060  -25.8  7.7    -7.5  -2.6    -12.1  2.3 
  2000–2060  -27.8  27.7    -9.7  2.5    -11.8  9.8 
                   
Income per worker  2000–2030  0.2  50.6    -21.3  34.1    0.1  23.7 
  2030–2060  -18.5  31.5    7.2  16.6    -5.6  23.8 
  2000–2060  -18.4  98.1    -15.7  56.4    -5.5  53.1 
                   
Income tax rate  2000–2030  -6.2  1.5    20.6  -15.3    0.8  -3.4 
  2030–2060  -40.8  -9.2    -22.2  -19.8    -21.6  -14.7 
  2000–2060  -44.4  -7.8    -6.2  -32.1    -21.0  -17.5 
                   
Education spending   2000–2030  -6.1  53.3    -5.4  13.9    0.8  19.8 
per worker  2030–2060  -51.8  19.3    -16.7  -6.5    -26.1  5.8 
  2000–2060  -54.7  82.8    -21.2  6.6    -25.5  26.7 
Source: Computed by author. 
1/ All numbers refer to percentage changes between the years indicated in the time period. 
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Table 3. Model Comparisons 1/ (aggregate values) 
 




(No Labor Mobility) 
   
Perfect Labor Mobility 
Model 
with Migrants Voting 
Only in Host Country 
   
Labor Mobility Model 
with Migrants Voting in 
Both Countries and 
Income Tax on Brain 
Drain 




























                   
Number of workers  2000–2030  22.2  97.2    150.2  46.8    27.7  95.0 
  2030–2060  9.1  36.0    27.3  23.8    16.7  34.0 
  2000–2060  33.3  168.2    218.5  81.7    49.1  161.4 
                   
Total capital stock   2000–2030  29.8  382.8    27.0  222.5    27.0  222.5 
  2030–2060  7.3  168.5    84.0  107.7    27.5  144.2 
  2000–2060  39.2  1196.4    133.7  570.0    61.9  687.7 
                   
Total human capital   2000–2030  18.9  134.0    144.3  54.4    28.2  109.3 
  2030–2060  -19.0  46.5    17.7  20.6    2.6  37.1 
  2000–2060  -3.7  242.6    187.6  86.2    31.5  186.9 
                   
Total income   2000–2030  22.4  197.1    96.9  96.9    27.8  141.4 
  2030–2060  -11.1  78.9    36.4  44.3    10.2  65.9 
  2000–2060  8.7  431.5    168.6  184.0    40.8  300.3 
                   
Income tax rate  2000–2030  -6.2  1.5    20.6  -15.3    0.8  -3.4 
  2030–2060  -40.8  -9.2    -22.2  -19.8    -21.6  -14.7 
  2000–2060  -44.4  -7.8    -6.2  -32.1    -21.0  -17.5 
                   
Total education   2000–2030  14.7  202.3    136.8  67.2    28.8  133.6 
spending  2030–2060  -47.4  62.2    6.0  15.8    -13.7  41.8 
  2000–2060  -39.7  390.3    151.0  93.6    11.1  231.3 
Source: Computed by author. 













Figure 1. Population Pyramid of the Mediterranean Region (2010 and 2050) 
 
 
Source: United Nations World Population Prospects (2010 Revision). Population share calculations were 
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Source: United Nations World Population Prospects (2010 Revision). Population share calculations were 
computed by the author. 
 
 




Source: United Nations World Population Prospects (2010 Revision). Population share calculations were 
computed by the author. 
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Source: United Nations World Population Prospects (2010 Revision). Population share calculations were 
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Source: 2010 World Development Indicators, The World Bank. 
 




Source: 2010 World Development Indicators, The World Bank.   18 




Source: 2010 World Development Indicators, The World Bank. 
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Figure 10. Composition of the Change in Number of Workers in Europe 


















































Figure 11. Composition of the Change in Number of Workers in SMCs 
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Figure 12. Composition of the Change in Number of Workers in Europe 



















































Figure 13. Composition of the Change in Number of Workers in SMCs 
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